Ringkasan disertasi Support for ethno-religious violence in Indonesia by Tri Subagya, Yustinus
191  
RINGKASAN DISERTASI 
SUPPORT FOR ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA1
Y. Tri Subagya
Universitas Sanata Dharma, Yogyakarta
E-mail: ytrisubagya@yahoo.com
Diterima: 2-11-2015    Direvisi: 23-11-2015          Disetujui: 7-12-2015
ABTRACT
This study focused on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence in Indonesia. It employed a cross-cultural comparative research design involving Muslim and Christian 
respondents from different ethnic groups in two research areas. One of these areas, Ambon, experiences frequent 
eruptions of inter-group violence, while the other, Yogyakarta, is relatively peaceful; while disputes have occurred 
occasionally, they have not led to massive intergroup violence. This research used a mixture of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches This study finds stronger identification with religion than with ethnicity. Muslims 
show greater ethno-religious identification than Christians. It also presents evidence for the proposition regarding 
religiocentrism in which a positive evaluation of the religious in-group is related to in-group identification and 
induces derogatory attitudes towards out-groups. The findings are also consistent with propositions concerning 
nationalistic attitudes which suggest that increased ethno-religious identification reduces nationalism.  
Keyword: ethnicity, religion, ethno-religious identification, support for violence, perceived group threat, religio-
centrism, nationalism
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menguji hubungan antara identifikasi etnik dan agama dan dukungan terhadap kekerasan 
antarkelompok di Indonesia. Penelitian dilakukan dengan menggunakan perbandingan lintas budaya yang 
melibatkan responden Muslim dan Kristen dari berbagai kelompok etnik di dua wilayah penelitian. Ambon, yang 
merupakan salah satu wilayah penelitian, sering mengalami letupan kekerasan antarkelompok, sedangkan di 
Yogyakarta kondisinya relatif tenang; walaupun permusuhan kadang-kadang terjadi, hal tersebut tidak meledak 
menjadi kekerasan antarkelompok yang masif. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan campuran antara 
kuantitatif dan kualitatif. Studi ini menunjukkan lebih kuatnya identifikasi agama dibandingkan etnisitas. Muslim 
memperlihatkan identifikasi agama dan etnik yang lebih kuat dibandingkan Kristen. Studi ini juga menyajikan 
bukti terkait teori religiosentrisme bahwa orang cenderung mengevaluasi secara positif kelompoknya sendiri 
dan cenderung  merendahkan kelompok lain. Temuan studi ini juga konsisten dengan proposisi terkait sikap 
nasionalisme yang memperlihatkan bahwa meningkatnya identifikasi etnik dan agama mengurangi nasionalisme.
Kata kunci: etnisitas, agama, identifikasi etnik dan agama, dukungan terhadap kekerasan, ancaman yang diper-
sepsikan kelompok, religiosentrisme, nasionalisme
1 To be defended in Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands, on 28 September 2015
INTRODUCTION
Ethno-religious violence got a serious scholarly 
attention in Indonesia when the collective vio-
lence started to escalate widely in the country 
in 1990. An enormous amount of literature on 
ethno-religious conflicts has emerged as a result 
of research from a wide range of theoretical 
frameworks and the application of a variety of 
methods. Some have focused on its historical 
roots, while others have paid more attention to its 
impact. They have presented various arguments 
from different perspectives while looking at its 
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context and escalation. Some have paid atten-
tion to the legacy of violence from the colonial 
era and the authoritarian state (Colombijn and 
Lindblad, 2002), the contestation of power in 
times of political transition (Bertrand, 2004), 
the competition of local contenders for resources 
(Van Klinken, 2006) and the global growth of ter-
rorism networks (Sidel, 2006; ICG, 2011). Most 
studies have concentrated on historical factors, 
the dynamics of structural transformation and the 
elites who have competed for power as the ele-
ments that have led to the emergence of collective 
violence. Individual attitudes at grassroots level, 
such as those of villagers, religious communities 
or students who have supported the violence, 
have been factored in less, if not neglected, in 
their analyses. 
This study adds new insights to this body of 
knowledge by focusing on the relationship be-
tween ethno-religious identification and support 
for intergroup violence. It examines the relation-
ship between ethno-religious identification and 
the ways in which people support different levels 
of violence perpetrated by their own group, such 
as protest, intimidating demonstrations, the de-
struction of property or the injuring or killing of 
people belonging to other ethno-religious groups. 
It conducts micro-level analyses of individuals’ 
support for ethno-religious violence. Support for 
ethno-religious violence was viewed as a dimen-
sion of the exclusionary reactions that arise from 
rational intergroup competition and the dynamics 
of ethno-religious identification.
The substantial questions of the research 
included both descriptive and explanatory 
aspects. The descriptive questions asked about 
the presence of ethno-religious identification and 
support for intergroup violence among Muslims 
and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta; also 
about the ways in which ethno-religious identifi-
cation and support for intergroup violence among 
Muslims and Christians is observable in the two 
cities.  The explanatory questions addressed three 
issues. The first examined the relationship be-
tween ethno-religious identification and support 
for intergroup violence. The second assessed the 
influence of social characteristics such as gender, 
parents’ occupation or household income on this 
relationship, and the third tested whether the 
relationships are affected by intermediate deter-
minants such as perceived group threat, salience 
of identity, intergroup contact, memory of past 
violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, 
nationalistic attitudes and distrust. The set of ex-
planatory questions can be formulated as follows:
1. To what extent is there a relationship between 
ethno-religious identification among Chris-
tians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta 
and support for intergroup violence?
2. To what extent is there a relationship 
between ethno-religious identification 
among Christians and Muslims in Ambon 
and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup 
violence considering other individual-level 
determinants?
3. To what extent can we explain the relation-
ship between ethno-religious identification 
among Christians and Muslims in Ambon 
and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup 
violence with particular intermediate deter-
minants? 
METHOD
This study employs a cross-cultural comparative 
research design involving Muslim and Christian 
respondents from different ethnic groups in 
two research areas. One of these areas, Ambon, 
experiences frequent eruptions of inter-group vio-
lence, while the other, Yogyakarta, is relatively 
peaceful. In Ambon, the social border between 
Muslims and Christians clearly defines their liv-
ing space and their social activity. Both groups 
have established boundaries, and seldom interact 
across the demarcation of religious belonging. 
Their ethno-religious identification is so strong 
that tensions between Muslims and Christians 
have repeatedly led to intergroup violence. In 
contrast, the relationship between ethno-religious 
groups in Yogyakarta is relatively peaceful; while 
disputes have occurred occasionally, they have 
not led to massive intergroup violence.  
This research uses a mixture of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. It provides a large 
data set stemming from a survey that included re-
spondents who were followed up with qualitative 
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interviews. The research sample was randomly 
drawn from the student population of six univer-
sities. At each research site, I chose one Christian 
university, one Muslim university and one state 
university. Overall, 1,500 respondents, equally 
distributed over these universities, became the 
research sample. The key informants for the 
interviews were selected from both respondents 
and non-respondents of the survey; for the re-
spondents, the interviews were conducted after 
they had agreed to follow up their statements. 
They were asked to expand on their reasons 
and give additional explanations concerning the 
research topics. 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The analyses of the large data set provided 
evidence for ethno-religious identification 
among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta. Respondents came from a range of 
ethnic groups. A large number of Muslims were 
Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Ambonese or 
Butonese, while the Christians were predomi-
nantly Ambonese, Javanese, Bataknese or Chi-
nese. Smaller ethnic groups were also represented 
in my sample, such as Minangkabau, Minahasa, 
Toraja, Timorese, Buginese, Makassarese and 
Papua.
All the ethno-religious groups considered 
ethnic identification to be an important element of 
their identities, but Muslims showed stronger eth-
nic identification than Christians. They spoke their 
ethnic language more frequently and attended eth-
nic ceremonies more often. More Muslims were 
also members of ethnic organizations. Regarding 
religious identification, Muslims participated in 
collective rituals more often than Christians. They 
also prayed and attended religious services more 
frequently. Only in terms of rites of passage was 
Muslim participation lower; those who did attend 
the ceremonies did so mainly for non-religious 
reasons, such as solidarity with neighbours, or to 
respect the invitation of their relatives. Muslims 
also had more religious in-group friends and less 
religious out-group friends. 
My qualitative data supported the findings 
of the quantitative analyses. Ethnic identifica-
tion among Muslims was stronger than among 
Christians. In Ambon, Muslims spoke their ethnic 
language more often than Christians; this was 
particularly the case in traditional ceremonies in 
Muslim villages. Christians used the Indonesian 
language more frequently than their ethnic 
tongue. The qualitative data also showed that 
religious identification was stronger than ethnic 
identification in both Ambon and Yogyakarta. 
The interviews revealed that personal religious 
expression and religious practices have become 
increasingly important over the last decade. 
Most of the interviewees confirmed that they 
participate in traditional ceremonies and religious 
rituals and gave religious reasons for doing so. 
Only in rites of passage did religious rituals blend 
with ethnic rituals; more specifically, in marriage 
and funerary rituals. Here participation also 
stemmed from non-religious reasons. Compared 
to Christians, Muslims were more involved in 
religious organizations or religiously affiliated 
political organizations. A few of the Christians 
also claimed to engage in religious organizations, 
but these organizations have political interests. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data confirmed 
that religious identification was stronger and 
more important than ethnic identification, and 
that overall, Muslims showed stronger religious 
identification than Christians. 
The second research question, on support 
for intergroup violence, was also answered via 
both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The 
measurement of support for violence underwent 
rigorous factor analyses. I found that such support 
has two dimensions: support for public criticism 
and demonstrations, and support for harm to per-
sons and property. In general, respondents tended 
to support public criticism and demonstrations, 
but rejected support for harm to persons and 
property. When the comparison between Muslims 
and Christians was made, Muslims were more 
supportive of demonstrations and relatively less 
supportive of harm to persons and property than 
Christians. My interviews elaborated the findings 
of the quantitative analyses: that Muslims sup-
ported harm less, but supported demonstrations 
more than Christians. In Ambon, all informants, 
Muslims as well as Christians expressed sup-
port for harm, especially those who had strong 
memories and past experiences of violence. Most 
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of them also agreed with supporting harm to 
persons and property as an act of self-defence. 
The data triangulation affirms that both Muslims 
and Christians supported public criticism and 
demonstrations more than harm to persons and 
property. 
The first explanatory question, on the rela-
tionship between self-definition of ethno-religious 
groups and support for harm, showed that most 
ethno-religious groups, the exceptions being Sun-
danese Muslims and Javanese Christians, were 
more likely to support harm than Javanese Mus-
lims. Most support was given by the Madurese 
Muslims and the Ambonese Christians. On sup-
port for demonstrations, Muslim ethno-religious 
groups were more supportive, while the Christian 
ethno-religious groups were less supportive than 
the Javanese Muslims. 
The second explanatory question was 
answered by testing the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for 
intergroup violence. I found that respondents’ 
support for harm was influenced by their number 
of friends of the same religion. Those who have 
many friends of the same religion showed less 
support for harm. On support for demonstrations, 
I found that participation in collective rituals and 
the membership of religious organization were 
strong determinants. The more active people 
participated in collective rituals, the more they 
supported demonstrations. In addition, those 
who are members of religious organizations also 
showed more support for demonstrations than 
non-members.
Individual determinants, such as education 
and profession of parents, or gender of respon-
dents, did not significantly affect the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support 
for violence; the results were similar for support 
for harm and support for demonstrations. Respon-
dents whose parents are farmers showed more 
support than respondents whose parents work as 
managers, clerks, traders, machine operators or 
manual labourers. Respondents from relatively 
higher income levels showed more support than 
those with lower income levels. In general, the 
findings demonstrated that support for violence 
could only partially be explained by individual 
socio-economic status; ethno-religious identifica-
tion persisted as a strong determinant after taking 
these individual characteristics into account.
The third research question was answered by 
testing the influence of intermediary variables on 
the relationship between ethno-religious identifi-
cation and support for violence. These variables 
were derived from diverse theoretical insights, 
and comprised perceived group threat, salience of 
identity, intergroup contact, memory of violence, 
perceived discrimination, religiosity (including 
attitudes towards religious plurality, religiocen-
trism and fundamentalism), nationalistic attitudes 
and distrust. Concerning support for harm, I 
found that perceived group threat, religiocentrism 
(i.e. positive in-group attitudes), pluralism and 
nationalistic attitudes influenced the relationship. 
The more that people perceived group threat and 
the more they had positive in-group attitudes, the 
more likely they were to support harm to persons 
and property, which supported my hypotheses 
in this respect. Contrary to my expectations, 
people with a pluralistic religious view showed 
more support for harm. Support for harm was 
also stronger when nationalism was relatively 
low. Concerning support for demonstrations, the 
relevant intermediate determinants were salience 
of ethnic identity and acceptance of hermeneutic 
interpretations: the more the respondents accepted 
the salience of ethnic identity and the more they 
agreed that Holy Scriptures need hermeneutic 
interpretation (contrary to fundamentalism), the 
more they supported demonstrations.
This study makes an innovative contribution 
to the theoretical and methodological develop-
ment of research on ethno-religious conflict in 
Indonesia. I will discuss this contribution in terms 
of the research questions, the measurements and 
the data analysis. 
First, I set out to answer descriptive ques-
tions about ethno-religious identification and 
support for intergroup violence, and explana-
tory questions on the relationship between these 
variables with individual characteristics as well 
as intermediate determinants. These questions 
have not been explored in previous studies on 
conflict in Indonesia; most have paid more at-
tention to the wider context of economic and 
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political developments, e.g. the three influential 
studies of Bertrand (2004), Sidel (2006) and Van 
Klinken (2007a). While their studies certainly 
contribute to the overall understanding of the 
causes and effects of violence in Indonesia, they 
do not provide adequate explanations as to why 
individual people support violence; neither do 
they test theories about intergroup violence in 
relation to other theories. This study seeks to 
complement previous studies by explaining the 
relationship between ethno-religious identifica-
tion and support for intergroup violence. I tested 
hypotheses regarding the influence of individual 
determinants and different measures for religious 
identification, support for intergroup violence as 
well as intermediary variables.
 This study is not alone in seeking to explain 
support for violence in Indonesia via the analysis 
of individuals, but it is the only one to use mixed 
methods: quantitative methods with a large 
number of respondents, and qualitative methods 
with semi-structured interviews with a selection 
of these respondents. One of the previous investi-
gations of the individual angle was conducted by 
Adam (2010) who examined how ordinary people 
became involved in the Ambon conflict. Via case 
studies carried out in the villages of Hila, Kaitetu 
and Waai, he described the involvement of people 
in the conflict as the result of long-standing 
competition along religious lines over land and 
jobs. The competition between Ambonese and 
immigrants, and between Muslims and Christians 
made up the context in which violence erupted. 
His findings, however, are limited to the areas 
in which he made his observations. Being based 
in specific contexts, his study lacks standardised 
measurements for intergroup comparisons. Unlike 
previous studies, my work integrates qualitative 
or quantitative approaches in the research design, 
methods and analyses. The quantitative approach 
provides general findings, which are elaborated in 
more detail with the help of interviews. I did not 
find contradictory results between quantitative 
and qualitative data. Triangulation of the quan-
titative and qualitative data gives the findings 
greater validity and reliability.
Second, I developed measurements that were 
guided by theories related to Western countries. 
As mentioned earlier, these were primarily social 
identity theory, realistic conflict theory and ethnic 
group conflict theory; I made additional use of 
theories related to salience of identity, intergroup 
contact, memory of violence, perceived discrimi-
nation, attitudes towards plurality, religiocen-
trism, fundamentalism, nationalistic attitudes 
and distrust. On this basis, I made inventories of 
measurements that have been repeatedly tested in 
Western (and in some cases also Asian) countries. 
Reliability as indicated by Cronbach’s alpha is the 
main consideration for the inclusion of specific 
measurements. I then assessed the standardised 
measurements and adjusted them for their appli-
cation to my Indonesian research context. Some 
measurements that I could not find in previous 
studies were explored through meticulous discus-
sions of the variables. For instance, the measure 
for ethno-religious identification was adapted 
from the ethnic identification measure from Phin-
ney (1992) and Phinney and Ong (2007). I added 
religious identification to the measure by taking 
into account the ritualistic dimension of religion 
(Allport and Ross, 1967; Scheepers et al., 2002b). 
I also made improvements to my measure-
ment of support for violence. Since I could not 
find appropriate measurements from Western 
societies, I used the measurement of Hadiwitanto 
et al. (2007) as a starting point. His questionnaire 
is relevant as he investigated religion, social trust 
and conflict in Ambon, but his measurement of 
support for violence was inadequately developed 
since the levels of violence he distinguished were 
unequally distributed over different societal do-
mains (political, economic, socio-cultural and re-
ligious). This imbalance would affect the results, 
possibly eliminating important factors before data 
gathering. I therefore modified the measurements 
so that they were distributed evenly over the eco-
nomic, political, cultural and religious domains. 
Each domain was then assessed in terms of four 
dimensions of support for violence: support for 
public debates, for demonstrations, for corporal 
and for material harm.  
I  found two dimensions: a high level of sup-
port, i.e., support for harm to persons and property, 
and a low level of support, i.e., support for public 
criticism and demonstrations. For independent 
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variables, factor analyses were run for religious 
practices and religious ceremonies. Muslims and 
Christians were given similar measurement items, 
even though the two religious groups differ in 
their ceremonies. For Muslims, the ceremonies 
included circumcision, weddings, funerals, fast-
ing, Idul Fitri and Idul Adha. For Christians, the 
questions about ceremonies included baptism, 
weddings, Christmas, Easter, funerals and fast-
ing. The result was three dimensions to use as 
comparable model solutions for both Muslims 
and Christians: collective rituals, rites of pas-
sage and religious practices. For intermediary 
determinants, I found that perceived group threat 
was concentrated in two dimensions: politics and 
economy on the one hand and socio-cultural fac-
tors on the other. Salience of identity also had two 
dimensions: ethnicity and religion. Intergroup 
contact was measured by quantity and quality 
of contact. Quantity was clearly constructed in a 
single dimension. I also decided to use a single 
dimension for quality of contact, since the factor 
analysis determined two dimensions with a high 
correlation: closeness and cooperation, evaluation 
and equality. Other intermediary determinants 
such as perceived discrimination, religiocentrism, 
attitudes towards religious plurality, religious 
fundamentalism and nationalistic attitudes had 
two dimensions respectively.
To analyze the differences between Muslims 
and Christians, and the variation between ethno-
religious groups, I compared their means and 
made t-tests. An analysis of variance was also 
made by testing all dimensions to reveal their 
correlation and tendencies. For this, I took into 
account of the statistic of F, the significance level, 
and the correlation among the tested variables. 
The analysis of variance specifically looked 
into the (linear versus non-linear) nature of the 
relationships between the dependent variable(s) 
and independent variables as well as relationships 
with control and intermediary variables. 
Finally, I conducted multivariate regression 
analyses. This study demonstrates the relevance of 
certain theories in Indonesia. I provided evidence 
that ethnic competition theory can explain the re-
lationship between ethno-religious identification 
and support for intergroup violence in Indonesia. 
The level of ethno-religious identification actu-
ally overwhelmed the individual determinants, 
which has not been shown in Western countries. 
I found evidence that the perception of out-group 
threat, positive attitudes towards religious in-
groups and nationalistic attitudes intermediate 
the relationship between ethno-religious iden-
tification and support for violence. Hence, the 
stronger the ethno-religious identification, the 
stronger the perceptions of out-group threat that 
induce support for harm. The stronger the level 
of ethno-religious identification, the higher the 
positive in-group attitudes that induce support 
for harm. Another interesting result was the 
negative influence of nationalism on support 
for violence, consistent with previous studies in 
Western contexts (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 
2001; Coenders et al., 2004). This study shows 
that declining nationalism increases support 
for harm. This is true in Indonesia; nationalism 
continues to decrease due to the struggle for 
local autonomy. Local conflicts such as those 
in Ambon are largely to do with the pursuit of 
greater local autonomy, as opposed to national 
interests. The devolution of power as a result 
of local autonomy has opened up competition 
over economic resources, and elite contestation 
of political power for their own interests. In 
order to maintain their power while adjusting to 
decentralization, the elites have often mobilized 
their followers through ethnic ties or religious 
networks to attain their objectives (Aspinal and 
Fealy, 2003: 6–9; Van Klinken, 2006: 138–143). 
However, the study revises a previous theory 
on pluralism. In earlier studies, pluralism is de-
scribed as the individual’s positive appreciation 
of religious plurality, either in the acceptance 
of underlying common elements of different 
religious traditions, or by stressing the value and 
richness of differences between religious tradi-
tions (Anthony et al., 2005; 2015). Therefore, 
pluralism is expected to have a negative associa-
tion with support for harm. My result pointed 
towards a positive relation, i.e., the more that 
individuals agreed with pluralism, the more they 
supported harm. This implied support for harm 
among respondents with an explicit personal 
(religious) interpretation of religious plurality. 
This support had no connection with the positive 
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attitudes towards religious plurality. It could arise 
from other factors–i.e. that respondents have their 
own, personal agenda in relation to support for 
violence. The support of violence had nothing to 
do with their pluralistic view.
In the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and support for demonstrations, 
salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic 
interpretation were intermediate determinants. 
Ethnic salience is the awareness of individuals 
of their ethnic categorization and identity and 
the importance of this ethnic identification to 
them (Phinney, 1990; Duckit, 2006: 154). As 
I predicted, this study provided evidence that 
ethnic salience mediated the relationship be-
tween ethno-religious identification and support 
for demonstrations. It highlighted the on going 
importance of ethnicity in Indonesia. In addition, 
more agreement with hermeneutic interpretations 
of sacred texts induced more support for dem-
onstrations, relatively. It means that support for 
demonstrations was also given by people who 
have a critical, but committed, attitude towards 
their own religious texts.  
CONCLUSION
Overall, the findings have supported the main 
theories and add explanations for other theories 
that I have examined in this study. The study 
have provided evidence for social identity theory, 
which holds that individuals always attempt 
to construct a positive social identity for their 
in-groups, and to disassociate themselves from 
out-groups (Tajfel, 1978; 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 
1986; Phinney and Ong, 2007). I have found 
stronger identification with religion than with 
ethnicity. When I compared the groups, Muslims 
showed greater ethno-religious identification than 
Christians. These findings have provided confir-
mation of previous studies in Indonesia that show 
the growth of religious identification, especially 
among Muslims since the 1990s (van Bruinessen, 
2004; Sidel, 2006; Hefner, 2011).
The findings on perceived group threat have 
validated ethnic group conflict theory, in which 
perceived threat is the strongest determinant for 
prejudicial and exclusionary attitudes towards 
out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsbert et 
al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2007; Savelkoul et al., 
2010). It suggests that this theory, which is able 
to explain exclusionary phenomena in Western 
countries, is also applicable to Indonesian society. 
Nonetheless, this study has not tested the con-
textual level that is part of the theory and which 
includes the influence of actual competition, 
migration and relative group size (majority and 
minority status). 
I have also presented evidence for the 
proposition regarding religiocentrism by Ster-
kens and Anthony (2008), in which a positive 
evaluation of the religious in-group is related to 
in-group identification and induces derogatory 
attitudes towards out-groups. However, in rela-
tion to religious attitudes towards plurality, my 
findings have contradicted earlier studies. While 
these studies have shown that pluralism reduces 
prejudice and hostility towards out-groups (An-
thony et al., 2005; cf. Anthony et al. 2015), my 
study has found evidence that people who have 
a pluralistic religious view do support violence. 
Seemingly, pluralism can be as much an indicator 
for religious identification as monism.
These findings have been consistent with 
propositions concerning nationalistic attitudes 
(Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), which sug-
gest that increased ethno-religious identification 
reduces nationalism (i.e. commitment to the na-
tional Indonesian state, and therefore opposition 
to appeals for regional autonomy). Lower levels 
of nationalism in turn lead to greater support 
for violence, which in my research contexts is 
mostly related to the struggle for emancipation 
by specific ethno-religious groups. The find-
ings therefore have supported the theoretical 
proposition that the degradation of nationalism 
contributes to the outbreak of ethno-religious 
violence (Bertrand, 2004).   
At the lower level of support for intergroup 
violence, i.e. support for protests and demonstra-
tions, I have found ethnic salience and herme-
neutic interpretation to be relevant intermediate 
determinant variables. My study has validated 
earlier studies that show a significance correla-
tion between ethno-religious identification and 
ethnic salience: the greater the salience of ethnic 
identity, the higher the likelihood of support for 
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violence. Moreover, the acceptance of hermeneu-
tic interpretations at the root of religiosity also 
increases support for violence. This finding has 
contradicted an earlier study, which suggests that 
only fundamentalist interpretations of religious 
texts induce support for violence (Williamson et 
al., 2010).  
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